“He who commands the sea has command of everything,” the ancient Athenian general Themistocles once said. By that standard, the United States today commands very little. America’s supremacy on the waves—both in commercial shipping and naval power—has steadily eroded. As of 2025, the U.S. maritime industry is a shadow of its former self. The United States builds barely half a percent of the world’s new ships, while rival nations like China churn out more than half of global ship tonnage. The U.S. Navy, long unchallenged, now faces a Chinese fleet that is larger in sheer number of hulls. Meanwhile, America’s once-mighty merchant marine has dwindled to a negligible share of global trade. This loss of naval and maritime might leaves the nation vulnerable—strategically at the mercy of China, as many analysts warn—and unable to fully secure its economic future.

This article examines the decline of American naval power in both its military and commercial dimensions, why it matters profoundly for U.S. security and prosperity, and what can be done now and in the future to reclaim America’s maritime strength. It argues that losing the seas means losing trade and global influence—a gap that even America’s dominance in space technology cannot fill. Finally, it lays out specific, pragmatic policy recommendations for a renaissance in U.S. shipbuilding and shipping. The goal is to make the case that with focused action, the United States can once again build and command the fleets needed to secure its future.

I. The Decline of American Shipbuilding and Shipping

America’s maritime capacity has collapsed to historic lows. The nation that built thousands of Liberty ships during WWII and ruled the waves for decades now produces only a handful of large vessels each year. Of the tens of thousands of large commercial ships afloat worldwide, only around 0.1% were built in U.S. shipyards—an astonishingly small share. China, by contrast, is the world’s shipbuilding titan, constructing roughly 50–60% of new ships globally and possessing over 200 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. America long ago ceased to be a major builder of civilian cargo ships.

Not only does the United States build few ships, it also operates few ships in international commerce. There are fewer than 200 U.S.-flagged commercial vessels of significant size in operation, and only about 80 of those trade internationally. This is a minuscule fleet for a country of America’s economic size. By comparison, China’s commercial fleet numbers about 5,500 ships, and even small nations like Liberia or Panama (which offer “flags of convenience”) eclipse the United States in registered merchant tonnage. In total, U.S.-flagged vessels carry under 2% of global cargo by weight—meaning 98% of the world’s shipping, including most cargo to and from America, is carried on foreign ships. In effect, the lifelines of U.S. trade are almost entirely in foreign hands.

America’s shipyards have dwindled as well. Today only around 20 shipyards in the United States are capable of building large ocean-going ships. At the end of World War II, there were over 80 active yards, and U.S. yards could turn out a new ship in a matter of weeks. Now, building even a single naval vessel can take years. The industrial base that once sustained American seapower has atrophied, with many shipyards closed and the workforce aging (the average skilled shipbuilder is in the mid-50s). The shipbuilding workforce, about 146,000 strong today, is projected to need to double in size over the next decade to meet demand—but finding and training those skilled workers is a major challenge.

On the military side, the U.S. Navy is struggling to maintain its edge. The Navy’s battle force stands at just under 300 ships (about 295 today), down from over 500 ships during the late Cold War era. In contrast, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now fields around 400 battle-force ships and is expected to grow to 425 or more warships by 2030. This means China has already surpassed the United States in fleet size. American warships are generally more advanced technologically—for instance, the United States leads in nuclear-powered carriers and submarines—but quantity has a quality of its own. Facing a potential conflict (for example, over Taiwan), a larger Chinese fleet could absorb losses and keep fighting even as U.S. ships are depleted. U.S. naval planners have a goal to reach a 355-ship or even 380-ship Navy in coming decades, but under current trajectories that may not happen until well into the 2040s or 2050s. In fact, due to older vessels retiring, the Navy is on course to shrink slightly in the near term before any growth occurs.

Most critically, the United States lacks surge capacity to expand its fleets quickly if a crisis erupts. Because domestic ship production is so low and slow, the country cannot rapidly build the additional merchant ships or warships it might need in an emergency. During World War II, the United States famously ramped up shipbuilding—at one point completing an entire Liberty cargo ship in just four days—and produced over 5,000 ships in a few years. Such a feat would be impossible today. If war broke out in the Pacific, the United States would need to replace losses and add support vessels. Yet China is now far better positioned to mass-produce ships in wartime than the United States, raising serious questions about the country’s long-term ability to prevail or sustain a conflict.

In sum, America’s maritime industrial base has withered. The country builds few commercial ships, has few merchant vessels under its flag, and even its naval shipbuilding infrastructure is stretched thin. This decline is the result of decades of offshoring, under-investment, and policy neglect. As a result, the nation is dangerously reliant on others—especially on China—for critical maritime needs.

II. Why Sea Power Still Matters

Some might wonder: in an age of the internet, aerospace, and globalization, does old-fashioned sea power still matter? Absolutely. Control of the seas remains vital to both economic prosperity and military strength—and therefore to national power. The United States is a great maritime trading nation, and also a global force projector with far-flung alliances and commitments. Without robust capabilities at sea, both roles are in jeopardy.

First, consider commerce. The vast majority of international trade travels by sea. About 80% of U.S. international trade (by weight) moves on ships. Essential commodities like oil, liquefied natural gas, iron ore, and grain—as well as consumer goods and industrial components—all depend on ocean shipping. If those sea lanes are disrupted or dominated by rivals, the U.S. economy suffers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, shipping bottlenecks led to shortages and soaring freight costs. In one striking episode, foreign shipping lines (several based in Asia) sharply hiked freight rates by up to 1,000% and even rejected U.S. export cargo to rush empty containers back to China for more profitable loads. American farmers watched produce rot on docks because foreign carriers would not ship it. This exposed how vulnerable U.S. supply chains are when the country lacks control over shipping.

Even domestic economic needs rely on the maritime sector. Large portions of U.S. internal freight move via coastal and inland waterways under the Jones Act fleet (which requires U.S.-built, U.S.-flag ships for domestic routes). If the maritime industries continue to dwindle, the United States risks losing not only global trade capacity but also the ability to efficiently move goods within its own borders by water.

Second, military power relies on the seas. The U.S. armed forces are highly dependent on sealift—the capacity to transport equipment, fuel, ammunition, and personnel to overseas theaters. An estimated 90% of the supplies for U.S. military deployments are carried by ship. Fighter jets and satellites might grab headlines, but without ships carrying fuel and munitions, those high-tech forces cannot operate far from home. During any major conflict (in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East), the United States would need hundreds of cargo ships and tankers to sustain its troops. At present, the United States simply does not have that capacity. In a war scenario in the Pacific, the Pentagon estimates needing over 100 commercial tankers to move fuel—yet currently fewer than 15 are readily available for military use. In late 2024, the U.S. Navy had to idle 17 of its own support vessels because there were not enough civilian mariners to crew them. This “logistics Achilles heel” means that even if U.S. frontline warships are superior, the force could be crippled by lack of supply and transport.

Beyond logistics, sea control is an instrument of power projection in its own right. A strong U.S. Navy and merchant marine guarantee freedom of navigation for global commerce, deter piracy and coercion, and allow the United States to respond to crises anywhere on the globe. Aircraft carrier strike groups, for instance, enable the country to project airpower without needing foreign bases. Amphibious ships allow Marines to deploy for disaster relief or combat. If America cedes dominance of the seas, it also cedes the ability to influence events around the world. History shows that nations that command the sea lanes command their destiny—from the British Empire’s rise to America’s own 20th-century dominance after winning two world wars at sea.

In short, maritime power underpins economic security and national security. It is often said that “trade follows the flag,” meaning commercial success and naval strength reinforce each other. The United States has enjoyed unparalleled security and prosperity in part because it controlled the oceans through a powerful Navy and merchant fleet. If that control is lost, both national wealth and strategic position erode. As one maritime strategist put it, the United States is essentially “an island nation”—separated by oceans from Asia and Europe—and thus must treat maritime capability as a lifeline, not an optional luxury.

III. China’s Maritime Rise and America’s Vulnerability

The decline of U.S. maritime power would be concerning under any circumstances, but it is especially urgent given China’s dramatic rise as a sea power. Over the past two decades, China has executed a focused strategy to become the dominant player in global shipbuilding, commercial shipping, and naval might. That strategy is bearing fruit—often at America’s expense.

On the commercial side, China is now the world’s shipbuilder and shipowner par excellence. Chinese shipyards produce more ships each year than the rest of the world combined. Massive state subsidies and strategic industrial policies (what Beijing calls “military-civil fusion”) have built up Chinese shipbuilders into globally competitive giants. Crucially, China’s government does not separate military and civilian shipbuilding—merchant shipyards can be quickly repurposed to build naval vessels, and commercial ship sales abroad help fund China’s navy. The result is that China’s overall shipbuilding capacity is hundreds of times greater than America’s, capable of producing not only merchant megaships but also aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines at speed.

China has also built the world’s largest merchant fleet. Chinese-flagged commercial vessels number in the thousands (5,000+ ships). Chinese state-owned shipping companies like COSCO and China Merchants are among the top carriers on the planet, operating extensive networks that carry everything from containers to oil. This gives Beijing significant leverage over global trade flows. Chinese companies and banks also control a notable share of the world’s port infrastructure (from Sri Lanka to Greece to Pacific islands), extending China’s influence over the maritime supply chain.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Navy has rapidly expanded. Two decades ago, the PLAN was a mostly coastal defense force. Today it boasts modern destroyers, cruisers, amphibious assault ships, and ballistic-missile submarines—and in sheer numbers it is larger than the U.S. Navy. As of 2025, China has roughly 400 battle-force ships versus about 295 for the United States, and the gap is widening. China is launching new warships at a prodigious rate (in some categories several times faster than the United States), and its naval shipyards work continuously with generous government backing. By 2030, China could have well over 425 combat ships, including third-generation aircraft carriers and vessels equipped with advanced hypersonic missiles. Importantly, many of China’s ships operate in home waters in the Western Pacific, whereas the United States must deploy globally. In a conflict near China’s shores, the PLAN’s numerical advantage would be even more pronounced.

This Chinese maritime dominance poses direct risks to the United States. Strategically, if China controls the seas of East Asia, it could potentially blockade key shipping routes, isolate U.S. allies like Taiwan or Japan, and dictate terms in those waters. American credibility as a security partner would falter if the United States could not uphold freedom of navigation or come to allies’ aid. Economically, China’s dominance means the United States is vulnerable to Chinese decisions for much of its trade, from shipping capacity to port infrastructure and equipment.

Moreover, if war were to erupt, China’s capacity to build and replace ships could dramatically outpace that of the United States and its allies. In one U.S. Naval War College war game, American and allied forces destroyed over 50 Chinese warships but lost around 20 U.S. and allied ships. Despite heavier Chinese losses in that scenario, analysts noted China’s larger navy could absorb the damage and keep fighting, while the United States would struggle to replace its losses. This echoes a historical truth: in prolonged conflicts, the nation that can build (or rebuild) more ships usually prevails. In World War II, the United States outbuilt Germany and Japan, ensuring victory. In a hypothetical 21st-century conflict, China may be positioned to outbuild the United States—a situation no American strategist wants to face.

Finally, China’s maritime ascendancy is part of its broader ambition to become the preeminent global power. Beijing has made no secret that it views the United States as a competitor to be overtaken both economically and militarily. Achieving sea control and shipping independence is core to that plan. If the United States passively allows its shipbuilding base to erode further, it is essentially conceding a key domain of great-power competition.

IV. Consequences of Losing Naval Supremacy

Given these trends, what would it mean for the United States to “lose the seas”? The consequences are stark—touching the American economy, military readiness, and geopolitical standing. The following are major risks if the United States fails to reverse its maritime decline:

• Economic leverage shifts to rivals. With U.S. commerce so dependent on foreign shipping, other nations (especially China) gain leverage over the American economy. Recent years have shown foreign carrier alliances—none of which are American—wielding outsized power over freight costs and routes. In extreme cases, hostile powers could disrupt U.S. trade by detaining or diverting ships, imposing embargoes, or manipulating shipping rates to harm U.S. industries. Even short of overt conflict, whoever owns the ships and ports can decide whose goods move first and cheapest. America’s supply chain resilience is low when 98% of imports (by volume) arrive via foreign-flag ships. A nation that cannot carry its own commerce must depend on the goodwill of others.
• Inability to project and sustain military force. As noted, the U.S. military’s ability to operate overseas hinges on sealift and naval strength. If the United States lacks tankers, cargo ships, and a strong Navy, forces could run out of ammunition, fuel, or spare parts during a conflict far from home. The Navy has already idled support vessels for lack of crews—a trend that could worsen without revitalization of the U.S. Merchant Marine. Without enough U.S.-flag merchant ships and trained mariners, even peacetime operations like humanitarian missions or strategic deployments become harder. America’s global reach—the foundation of deterrence and alliance commitments—would shrink. In a future crisis, an opponent might calculate that the United States cannot sustain a fight and thus be more tempted to aggression.
• Loss of industrial and innovation edge. The maritime industry is a high-tech, high-skill sector that drives innovation in steel, propulsion, and electronics. If the United States is not building ships, it forfeits leadership in these technologies, while China advances through scale and experimentation. Over time, the United States risks falling behind not just in ship count but in maritime technological prowess.
• Diminished global influence. A robust U.S.-flag presence in global shipping has intangible diplomatic benefits. If foreign ships dominate port calls, smaller nations may align policies with those flag states. Allies and adversaries notice when a great power loses capabilities; American credibility suffers if the country cannot build ships or secure sea lanes.
• Higher costs and strategic dependency. Reliance on foreign shipping and shipbuilding carries financial and strategic costs. U.S. businesses and the military pay billions to foreign carriers each year, effectively funding other nations’ fleets. In a crisis, services could be curtailed or priced punitively. If the United States suddenly needed to build ships, it might face delays or premiums at foreign yards—assuming assistance were available.

In summary, letting American naval and maritime power wane puts the nation at risk. It jeopardizes the U.S. economic lifeblood, the ability to defend the nation and its allies, and America’s standing as the world’s leading power. The oceans have always been arteries of commerce and conduits of military might—if the United States loses control of those arteries, the very heart of national strength is endangered.

V. Space Won’t Replace the Seas

A common counterargument is that U.S. dominance in space and technology can compensate for shortcomings at sea. The United States leads in satellite networks, precision-guided weapons, and cyber capabilities. But space superiority is not a substitute for sea power. Satellites enable communications, navigation, and surveillance; they do not carry goods, hold territory, or rescue allies. Every tank, supply crate, and humanitarian shipment still travels by ship or plane.

In fact, space and maritime power are complementary. The U.S. Navy relies on satellites for positioning and secure communications, while undersea fiber-optic cables—often overlooked—carry the vast majority of intercontinental digital traffic. Protecting sea lanes and maritime infrastructure is thus integral to protecting space-enabled capabilities. Nor does space dominance secure trade; there is no orbital shipping lane for iron ore or microchips.

The lesson is straightforward: the United States must excel in space and at sea; forfeiting one for the other would be a grave mistake.

VI. Rebuilding America’s Maritime Power: A Plan for the Future

Having diagnosed the problem, how can the United States reclaim its naval and maritime strength? The challenge is immense but not insurmountable. It will require a concerted national effort – policy changes, investments, and innovations – akin to a maritime renaissance. Fortunately, there is growing bipartisan recognition of the issue (as evidenced by recent legislation and strategies), and the current moment offers a rare alignment of political will and strategic necessity. Here we outline a comprehensive plan with specific measures to revive America’s shipbuilding industry, expand its fleets, and ensure the U.S. once again “commands the sea.”

1. Invest in Shipyard Infrastructure and Capacity: The foundation of any maritime resurgence is rebuilding the Maritime Industrial Base – the shipyards and factories that actually construct and repair vessels. The U.S. must expand and modernize its shipyards. This means providing incentives for new shipyards to be built and existing ones to be upgraded with advanced technology (such as automated welding, modular construction, and digital design tools). Proposals already on the table include a 25% investment tax credit for shipyard improvements and federal programs to finance new drydocks and capital equipment. The government can also leverage the Defense Production Act and other authorities to channel funds into critical shipbuilding facilities and suppliers (e.g. makers of engines, propellers, and steel plate). An example idea is having the government purchase and lease modern shipyard equipment to U.S. yards to boost efficiency. In addition, the U.S. should increase the number of active shipyards: partnering with allies like Japan and South Korea could help jump-start new U.S. yards with state-of-the-art practices. (One creative concept is a temporary program to let allied companies co-build ships in the U.S. under relaxed rules, bringing their expertise while new yards are established.) Expanding shipyard capacity is crucial not only for naval vessels but also for a larger commercial fleet. Simply put, America needs more “dock space” and production lines to build the hundreds of ships envisioned under this plan in the coming years

2. Revitalize the Shipbuilding Workforce: Building more ships will require many more skilled workers – naval architects, engineers, welders, electricians, pipefitters, and more. Today’s shipbuilding workforce is too small and aging out (average age 55), with high turnover among younger workers. A national workforce strategy is needed to attract and train the next generation of shipbuilders. This should include expanding trade school and apprenticeship programs in maritime trades. Major shipbuilders like Newport News and Ingalls already run apprenticeship programs that pay people while training them in a trade – these could be scaled up with federal support. U.S. educators and state agencies should introduce maritime career pathways in high schools and community colleges, so more young Americans are exposed to these good-paying jobs. Given the current cultural bias toward four-year degrees, outreach is key: a campaign to show that “building ships builds America” could inspire pride and interest in these careers.

A particularly rich talent pool lies in America’s veterans and military personnel. Each year, thousands of service members leave active duty; many have technical skills (mechanics, electricians, logisticians) and a strong sense of mission. U.S. industry and government should actively recruit transitioning veterans into shipbuilding and Merchant Marine careers, framing it as a way to continue serving the nation. The Department of Defense can adjust its transition assistance programs to highlight maritime careers and connect interested vets with shipyard job opportunities. Likewise, those who are unable to enlist in the armed forces (due to strict medical or age requirements) could be steered towards maritime industry jobs as an alternate way to contribute to national security.

Another idea is to expand maritime training and component manufacturing inland, while keeping final assembly and launch at deep-water yards. The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and state maritime colleges produce licensed officers, but the United States may need additional pipelines for shipyard trades and maritime engineers. Congress could pair incentives— “Maritime Prosperity Zones”—with community-college apprenticeships and suppliers in inland or economically distressed regions. Inland sites would focus on training and building modules, systems, and equipment, shipped by rail or barge to coastal or Great Lakes shipyards for final integration and launch. The key is a whole-of-nation approach: treat the country as one extended shipyard—skills and parts spread widely, hulls finished on deep water—to ease local labor bottlenecks and build broad political support. 

3. Expand the U.S. Merchant Fleet: Reviving American sea power means not just building warships, but also having a robust merchant marine for commerce and logistics. To increase the number of U.S.-flag commercial vessels, the United States needs to tackle the core issue: it is currently far more expensive to build and operate ships under the U.S. flag than under foreign flags. Therefore, a mix of carrots and sticks is necessary to make U.S.-flag shipping competitive. On the incentive side, the government can provide tax breaks or subsidies for ship owners who choose U.S. flag and crew. For instance, a refundable tax credit could offset the operating cost differential of using American crews (who are paid higher wages than many foreign mariners). The Maritime Security Program (MSP) already provides stipends to a small fleet of U.S.-flag vessels that are militarily useful – this program could be expanded, and a new Tanker Security Program is being initiated to add U.S.-flag tankers. These ensure a baseline of privately owned ships ready for defense needs.

Crucially, Congress is advancing the SHIPS for America Act (Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security Act), which has proposals to guarantee cargo for U.S.-flag ships. One provision would mandate that a certain portion of U.S. government cargo (including military, aid, and other federal shipments) be carried on U.S.-built, U.S.-flag vessels. This expands existing “cargo preference” laws and creates assured demand for American ships. Even more boldly, the SHIPS Act suggests that by 2029, a portion of goods imported from China must be transported on U.S.-flag ships. This requirement would directly reduce reliance on Chinese shipping for critical supply lines. While this is an aggressive step (and would need careful implementation to avoid major cost spikes), it sends a powerful signal – essentially reserving a slice of the enormous U.S.–China trade for American carriers. A “U.S.-flag reservation” of even 10–20% of imports would immediately spur companies to commission new U.S.-built ships to handle that cargo, knowing the business is guaranteed. The logic is to create a stable market that makes it commercially viable to invest in American ships.

To support such fleet expansion, U.S. policymakers also need to finance shipbuilding in smarter ways. Traditional programs like Title XI ship financing (government loan guarantees for ship construction) should be revamped into a more flexible revolving fund. New Shipbuilding Industrial Investment incentives can be offered – for example, low-interest federal loans or grants to shipowners who order ships from U.S. yards (similar to how some countries offer buyers credit). One idea is a Maritime Security Trust Fund, as mentioned in a recent executive order, which would earmark customs duties or tariffs specifically to fund maritime programs. This would provide a consistent funding source to build ships and train mariners, rather than relying on yearly budget whims.

In expanding the merchant fleet, the United States should not overlook modernization: encouraging ships that are militarily useful (roll-on/roll-off ships, tankers, container ships that can carry defense gear) and possibly investing in dual-use designs (vessels that could serve commercial roles in peacetime but convert to auxiliary naval support in war). For instance, the Navy could support building a class of container ships with reinforced decks to land helicopters or modular systems to handle both cargo and military vehicles. These could operate commercially but be part of a reserve sealift force.

4. Strengthen and Streamline Naval Shipbuilding: On the military front, the U.S. needs to not only fund more warships but also fix the acquisition process that has often led to delays, cost overruns, and a mismatch between goals and reality. A critical reform is to provide greater predictability and efficiency in Navy shipbuilding programs. Shipbuilders need stable, multi-year contracts to plan workforce and investments. Thus, Congress and the Navy should commit to multi-year procurement for key ship classes (as is done for some submarine and destroyer programs) and avoid abrupt cancellations that disrupt production.

Improving procurement also means simplifying designs and avoiding constant changes. One reason U.S. ship programs run over-budget is the tendency to pack cutting-edge, unproven tech into each new class, or to change requirements mid-stream. Embracing modular design and incremental upgrades can help – build ships with room to add new tech later, rather than delaying the whole ship for the next new radar or missile system. A recent executive directive called for identifying excessive regulatory requirements and layers of approval that slow down vessel acquisition. Implementing those recommendations (such as reducing redundant oversight reviews and adopting more commercial best practices in Navy contracts) could shave years off build times.

Another aspect is fostering competition and new entrants in naval shipbuilding. Currently, a few big yards dominate Navy contracts. While they are vital, the Navy and Coast Guard could break some projects into smaller pieces that smaller or non-traditional shipyards can bid on – for example, auxiliary ships, barges, or unmanned vessels. The government might also invest in upgrading some mid-tier yards to qualify for Navy work, increasing the “number of competitors” and resilience of the industrial base. The goal is a broader, more robust base so that if one yard faces issues, others can pick up slack.

To ensure the Navy has the right mix of ships for the future, the U.S. Navy should also accelerate programs that address emerging needs – like light amphibious warships (for distributed operations in the Pacific), next-generation destroyers and frigates, and the Columbia-class submarines (crucial for nuclear deterrence). Fully funding and executing these programs on schedule will help close the gap with China’s fleet over time. It’s also time to seriously explore new technologies such as unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, which could complement manned ships. The U.S. can leverage its tech advantage by fielding autonomous ships for tasks like surveillance or mine-sweeping, freeing up crewed ships for other missions. However, even unmanned vessels need to be built – another demand on shipyards – so again, capacity is key.

5. Leverage Allies and Partnerships: The United States doesn’t have to do all this alone. Working with allied nations can amplify our efforts in multiple ways. As noted, allies like Japan, South Korea, and European countries have advanced shipbuilding industries. The United States should invite allied investment in U.S. shipyards – for instance, a Korean shipbuilder might partner to open a new yard in the U.S., bringing modern techniques and training U.S. workers. Allied governments may also coordinate on ensuring a diverse supply chain for critical components (engines, electronics) so allied economies are not all dependent on China. Joint R&D projects in maritime tech (like clean ship fuels or advanced hull materials) could benefit all partners and keep the alliance collectively ahead of Chinese tech.

Allied cooperation is also vital in the operational realm. The U.S. Navy works closely with NATO and Indo-Pacific allies’ navies; The U.S. and allies can expand combined shipbuilding planning as well. One idea is to standardize certain ship designs or components among allies, so that each country’s production runs are larger and cheaper. If the U.S., for example, develops a next-gen frigate, perhaps Australia, Japan, or others could build variants of it – sharing the development cost and achieving economies of scale. This was partly done with the Aegis combat system (used by the U.S., Japan, Spain, etc.) and could extend to ship hulls.

Furthermore, the U.S. and allies should coordinate maritime policy responses to China. If the United States imposes tariffs or fees on Chinese shipping (as a response to unfair practices or to fund our maritime rebuilding), having allies enact similar measures would magnify the impact and prevent China from simply shifting business elsewhere. Indeed, a recent U.S. strategy calls for engaging allies on aligning trade policies in the maritime sector. A united front of major economies could insist on fair play (e.g. addressing China’s subsidies or requiring transparent shipping rates) and even develop alternative shipping corridors to reduce reliance on any single dominant player.

6. Reform Maritime Regulations and Governance: Part of America’s maritime decline traces back to policy choices that deregulated and globalized the shipping industry without safeguarding national interests. To rebuild, U.S. lawmakers should consider restoring some strategic regulation and oversight. This doesn’t mean heavy-handed control of all shipping, but smart measures to ensure the industry serves broad U.S. economic and security goals. For instance, the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) could be empowered to more strictly oversee the global carrier alliances that carry U.S. trade, preventing them from engaging in price gouging or discriminatory practices against American exporters (as happened during the pandemic). The FMC and Congress might revisit antitrust exemptions that currently allow foreign shipping cartels to operate – perhaps requiring them to incorporate in the U.S. or abide by fair-treatment rules as a condition for serving U.S. ports. In the early 20th century, the U.S. regulated shipping much like a utility to prevent monopolies and ensure reliability; a modernized version of that approach could balance competition with national interest.

Domestically, some regulations might be updated to facilitate growth. For example, streamlining Coast Guard inspection and certification processes for new ships (without compromising safety) can reduce costs and delays for U.S. ship operators. Environmental rules should be stable and consistent so that shipowners can invest confidently in cleaner vessels. Essentially, The United States needs a regulatory environment that promotes investment and fairness – neither a laissez-faire neglect that lets foreign players dominate, nor a stifling bureaucracy that discourages our own maritime entrepreneurs. Striking this balance will likely require continuous dialogue between industry, national security officials, and regulators.

7. Provide Stable Funding and Strategic Focus: Lastly, and overarching all the above, America’s leaders must commit to a sustained, long-term plan. Rebuilding maritime power won’t happen in one election cycle or one defense budget. It requires a consistent national strategy with funding that survives across administrations. A few promising steps have been taken: for instance, a recent Presidential Executive Order “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” mandates a whole-of-government Maritime Action Plan by end of 2025. It establishes a task force spanning defense, commerce, labor, transportation, and more, to tackle everything from shipyard expansion to training to targeting China’s unfair practices. This kind of high-level focus is critical. Similarly, the creation of an Office of Maritime and Industrial Base Policy within the National Security Council ensures regular White House attention on shipbuilding issues. And the bipartisan support for the SHIPS Act shows Congress is waking up to the challenge.

To turn plans into reality, funding must be lined up. Establishing the proposed Maritime Security Trust Fund would be a smart move – it could take a portion of customs duties or new fees (for example, on cargo arriving via non-U.S. ships) and dedicate it to maritime programs. This creates a self-sustaining source to finance the construction of vessels, port improvements, or training initiatives. Additionally, budgets for the Navy’s shipbuilding and the Maritime Administration’s programs should be considered national security priorities, not easy targets for cuts. The cost is not trivial – new ships and infrastructure run in the many billions – but compare it to the cost of losing a conflict or suffering an economic chokehold. In the big picture, investing in ships and shipyards is investing in national survival and prosperity.

Finally, leaders must communicate the vision to the American people. In the early Cold War, the U.S. rallied around building the “Arsenal of Democracy” – today the United States needs an arsenal of democracy on the waves: an expanded Navy and merchant marine that keep the world’s commerce free and America safe. Framing the narrative in inspiring terms – invoking U.S. history of shipbuilding triumphs and maritime heroism – can build public support. Americans should once again see shipbuilding not as some arcane or bygone trade, but as a cutting-edge, patriotic endeavor that creates jobs and guards the nation. With that public backing, policymakers will have the mandate to follow through year after year, ship by ship.

Conclusion: America as a Maritime Nation Again

The United States rose to greatness on the strength of its ships—from clipper ships and whalers to Liberty ships and carrier strike groups. Losing the seas would mean risking the nation’s economic lifeblood and weakening the shield that has protected the free world. As of late 2025, warning lights are flashing: a rival power outbuilding the U.S. Navy, foreign vessels carrying American commerce, and a declining industrial base at home. But the path to maritime renewal is clear.

By reinvesting in shipyards, workers, and ships—and by harnessing the innovation of the American economy and the strength of its allies—the United States can reclaim command of the seas. The steps outlined here are concrete and achievable. With strategic focus, the shipyard hammer, the sailor’s helm, the merchant convoy, and the carrier task force can again be instruments of American security and prosperity.

If the United States succeeds, the payoff will be enormous: good jobs, a stronger manufacturing base, reduced dependency on adversaries, and a larger, more capable Navy and Merchant Marine that deter war rather than invite it. Advanced technologies will shape the future—but the words of Themistocles still ring true. By reclaiming naval and shipbuilding strength, the United States will help write the rules of the maritime road in the 21st century. The seas are vast, but the way forward is clear. It is time for the United States to turn the tide, set a steady course, and rebuild American maritime dominance—so the nation remains a great maritime power able to secure peace and prosperity for itself and the world.

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