The United States now finds itself entangled in a rapidly escalating conflict between Israel and Iran, a crisis testing America’s resolve and principles in real time. In mid-June 2025, Israel launched surprise airstrikes deep into Iran – including Tehran itself – targeting nuclear facilities and military leaders. Iran retaliated with missile salvos against Israeli cities like Haifa and Tel Aviv. With casualties mounting on both sides and fears of a broader regional war, Washington is under immense pressure to define its role. Will America join the fray to support its ally Israel, or exercise restraint and champion diplomacy? The decisions made now will not only determine the war’s trajectory but also America’s moral and strategic standing.

President Donald Trump, just six months into his second term, campaigned on “America First” and ending “endless wars”. Yet the Israel-Iran conflagration has upended those intentions. Trump has publicly weighed military intervention – even hinting “next week is going to be big” – while also claiming Iranian officials are “eager to negotiate”. This duality reflects a tension at the heart of U.S. policy: how to balance coercive force with genuine diplomacy. Inside the administration, a fierce debate rages. Key figures like Vice President J.D. Vance and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard urge caution and prioritizing long-term U.S. interests, while others press for a hardline response in solidarity with Israel. Meanwhile, America’s intelligence community has assessed that Iran has not made a decision to build a nuclear bomb – a finding that calls for cool-headed strategy, yet is being challenged by hawks recalling the grave mistake of the 2003 Iraq WMD fiasco.

This deep-dive essay examines U.S. involvement in the Israel-Iran conflict as of June 21, 2025. It provides a brief historical overview of U.S.-Iran and U.S.-Israel relations – especially the nuclear diplomacy context – before analyzing the current crisis. We will explore the internal U.S. policy rift (from the Oval Office to Congress to the conservative base), the risks of American military action (escalation, regional blowback, and credibility gaps), and the fraught interplay between coercion and diplomacy. Throughout, the analysis maintains a balanced tone rooted in core values: moral leadership, credible strategic planning, and skepticism of being drawn into war without a clear long-term vision. The goal is to inform a well-informed American audience of voters, academics, and policy enthusiasts about the stakes and choices facing the United States, as the nation stands at a crossroads between reacting to events or asserting principled leadership.

I. Friends, Foes, and False Choices: America’s Contrasting Approaches to Israel and Iran

U.S.-Iran Relations – From Hostility to Hesitant Diplomacy: The United States and Iran have endured over four decades of enmity since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Once close under the pro-Western Shah, relations broke after the hostage crisis in 1979–1981 and Iran’s emergence as a revolutionary theocracy opposed to U.S. influence. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Washington and Tehran clashed indirectly – from Iran-backed militant attacks on U.S. forces and allies, to U.S. sanctions aiming to isolate Iran. A major flashpoint has been Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. and Israeli suspicions grew in the 2000s that Iran sought nuclear weapons under cover of civilian research. Years of sanctions and stalled talks followed, until the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the landmark nuclear deal brokered by the Obama administration alongside other world powers. JCPOA dramatically curbed Iran’s uranium enrichment and allowed intrusive inspections in exchange for sanctions relief, reflecting a triumph of diplomacy. However, the deal’s success was short-lived: President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA in 2018, accusing Iran of cheating and the accord of being insufficient. This torpedoing of the 2015 accord badly strained trust – Iran resumed enrichment and the U.S. reimposed crushing sanctions.

During Trump’s first term (2017–2021), U.S.-Iran tensions spiked. The Trump administration pursued “maximum pressure,” including sanctioning Iran’s oil exports and designating the Revolutionary Guard as terrorists. Tit-for-tat incidents ensued: Iran shot down a U.S. drone in 2019 and harassed Gulf shipping; the U.S. killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in a 2020 drone strike. Several times the two nations seemed on the brink of open conflict. Yet Trump also signaled ambivalence about a full war, calling off a retaliatory strike in 2019 at the last minute. This foreshadowed the dichotomy we see now – threats and shows of force on one hand, and talk of striking a “better deal” on the other.

U.S.-Israel Relations – Ironclad Allies, Divergent Aims: In contrast, America’s bond with Israel has been one of its closest global partnerships. Since Israel’s founding in 1948, and especially after 1967, the U.S. has committed to Israel’s security through military aid, diplomatic backing, and intelligence cooperation. American presidents of both parties stress Israel’s right to self-defense, and Israel in turn sees the U.S. as its indispensable protector on the world stage. This alliance, however, has sometimes seen differences in approach – especially regarding Iran. Israel views a nuclear-capable Iran as an existential threat, given Tehran’s hostile rhetoric and support for militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Accordingly, Israel has a long-standing policy of preemptively striking regional adversaries’ nuclear sites: famously destroying Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and a suspected Syrian reactor in 2007. Israeli leaders made clear they reserved the option to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities if diplomacy failed. U.S. administrations often tried to restrain such action, favoring sanctions and negotiations to avert a wider war in the Middle East. For instance, President Obama’s team reportedly worked to dissuade Israeli strikes on Iran in the early 2010s, channeling efforts into the JCPOA as the peaceful solution.

The nuclear deal exposed a rare open rift: Israel’s prime minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, fiercely opposed the JCPOA, even lobbying the U.S. Congress against it, arguing it left Iran with nuclear infrastructure intact. When Trump exited the JCPOA in 2018, Netanyahu applauded the move. Still, differences re-emerged as Iran’s nuclear advances accelerated post-2018. By 2025, Iran had enriched uranium closer to weapons-grade, though still officially for civilian purposes. The question of how far to go to stop Iran became urgent. Israel undertook covert sabotage and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists over the years, with tacit U.S. understanding. But an overt, large-scale Israeli attack on Iran – something that could trigger a full war – was a red line American presidents hoped to avoid. President Biden (2021–24) sought to revive some form of nuclear agreement but fell short, leaving an uneasy status quo of high enrichment but no bomb, and frequent Israeli-Iranian proxy skirmishes (in Syria, at sea, and via cyberwarfare).

This historical backdrop set the stage for the current explosive scenario. A new U.S. administration under Trump (2025) signaled both willingness to negotiate a “bigger, better deal” with Iran and a hardline posture aligning closely with Israel’s concerns. The presence of Trump – seen as very pro-Israel – in the White House likely emboldened Netanyahu’s government. And indeed, June 2025 marked a deadly turning point: Israel decided to act decisively against Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities, even at the price of open war.

II. The June 2025 Eruption: Israel Strikes and Iran Retaliates

In the early hours of Friday, June 13, 2025, Israel launched “Operation Rising Lion”, a massive surprise onslaught on Iran. Israeli jets and missiles struck targets across Iran, from nuclear facilities to military command centers – even sites in Tehran, Iran’s capital. The scale and audacity of the operation stunned the world. Israel had never before directly attacked the Iranian homeland in this manner. According to reports, the first wave of strikes decapitated much of Iran’s military leadership: Iran’s armed forces Chief of Staff, General Mohammad Bagheri, was killed, along with top deputies and the head of the Revolutionary Guard, General Hossein Salami. Eight senior IRGC aerospace commanders – key figures in Iran’s missile program – perished in a bunker in Tehran that Israel somehow penetrated. In one fell swoop, Israel eliminated figures considered architects of Iran’s defense and nuclear posture, a blow arguably even more severe than the 2020 Soleimani strike.

Simultaneously, Israeli missiles pounded Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The enrichment facility at Natanz, Iran’s main uranium site, was struck, knocking out its external power and potentially damaging underground halls. In central Iran, facilities in Isfahan province were also hit. Most provocatively, Israel set its sights on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant – a facility deeply buried under a mountain near Qom. Initial strikes spared Fordow, which lies 80-90 meters underground, too deep for Israel’s conventional bunker-busters. But Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, signaled that Fordow “has to be eliminated” before their campaign could be considered complete. This raised the specter of Israel requesting U.S. help, since only American weaponry – specifically the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) – could reliably destroy Fordow’s reinforced depths.

Israel’s offensive did not stop at military targets. In the days that followed, Israeli missiles struck an Iranian state TV headquarters in Tehran, dramatically caught on live broadcast as an explosion rocked the studio. Israeli warheads also hit civilian infrastructure: Iran accused Israel of bombing a hospital in the western city of Kermanshah, calling it a “war crime” after footage showed bloodstained corridors. Such attacks signaled an intent to cripple Iran’s will to fight – but they also rallied Iranian public outrage. Within Iran, even critics of the regime closed ranks against what was seen as unprovoked foreign aggression.

Iran’s response was swift and forceful, if less sophisticated. Within hours, Iran unleashed volleys of ballistic missiles and armed drones at Israel. Air raid sirens wailed over Tel Aviv and Haifa as Iran targeted population centers as well as strategic sites like oil refineries and ports. One Iranian missile struck Haifa’s petrochemical complex, killing three and forcing all refineries to shut down. Dozens of projectiles were intercepted by Israel’s air defenses, but a “small percentage” penetrated, killing at least 24 people in Israel over the first four days. In a chilling tit-for-tat, after Israel hit Iranian media, Iran issued warnings to evacuate Israeli TV channels and later struck targets in the Tel Aviv area, causing additional casualties.

Four days into this war, by June 16, the death toll had already reached alarming levels: close to 250 people killed combined. Iran reported over 220 dead from Israeli strikes (including at least 70 women and children), underscoring the high civilian cost. Israel’s toll was smaller (two dozen or more), thanks in part to its missile defenses, but fear gripped its population as missiles rained down. Neither side showed signs of restraint; indeed, rhetoric grew more incendiary. Iran’s Supreme Leader vowed fierce retaliation. Israel’s Defense Minister warned that “the residents of Tehran will pay the price – and soon” for Iranian missiles hitting Israeli civilians. Each reprisal invited the next in a dangerous escalation spiral.

Regional and Global Shockwaves

Beyond the immediate human cost, the conflict threatened broader chaos. Observers feared a spillover to Lebanon (via Hezbollah) or Iraq and Syria, where pro-Iran militias operate. By attacking Iran directly, Israel risked unleashing all of Tehran’s allied forces. Already, reports emerged of unrest in Iraq; and in Yemen, the Houthi rebels (aligned with Iran) might consider opening a new front against Israel or even Saudi Arabia. The geopolitical stakes were sky-high, conjuring comparisons to Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination igniting World War I – a small spark in one corner igniting a regional conflagration.

The economic fallout also quickly became apparent. Oil markets spiked on the news of hostilities. Brent crude oil jumped nearly 7% (to around $74.6 a barrel) in just days. Investors feared disruption to the Strait of Hormuz – the narrow Gulf chokepoint through which one-third of the world’s seaborne oil flows. Iran hinted it might close the strait as conflict intensified, something it had never even done during the brutal 1980s Iran-Iraq War. Such a move could push oil well above $100/barrel and wreak havoc on the global economy. Even absent that extreme, the uncertainty was driving up energy prices and could fuel inflation, undermining economic recoveries worldwide. Airlines rerouted flights away from Iranian and Gulf airspace, and global stock markets wobbled on war fears.

In short, Israel’s bid to eliminate a perceived existential threat had set off a chain reaction with no easy endgame. An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) emergency session warned that military action near nuclear sites risked radiological disaster and had “delayed indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution” on Iran’s nuclear issue. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi cautioned that continued strikes could “permanently damage efforts to revive nuclear talks” – talks which were already hanging by a thread.

III. Washington’s Dilemma: Internal Debates and Policy Schisms

For the United States, the Israel-Iran war presented a stark dilemma that cut to the core of U.S. foreign policy principles – and exposed deep divisions within Washington. President Trump and his team have been grappling with whether to intervene militarily on Israel’s behalf or hold back and push for a ceasefire and diplomacy. The debate is not just strategic but ideological, pitting the imperatives of an alliance and “toughness” against an emergent consensus that endless Middle East wars harm U.S. interests. Key administration figures and political influencers are pulling in opposite directions, creating a fractured decision-making environment.

President Trump’s Calculus: Donald Trump’s personal inclinations have always been something of a paradox. On one hand, he projects an image of strength and unpredictability – he warned Iran that further attacks would be met with “even more brutal” strikes, and even demanded Iran’s “unconditional surrender” of any nuclear ambitions. In a Truth Social post during the crisis, Trump thundered that “Iran must make a deal before nothing is left”, effectively endorsing Israel’s bombing campaign as leverage in nuclear negotiations. He even chillingly posted that the U.S. knows Supreme Leader Khamenei’s location but has chosen not to kill him “for now”. These statements echo Trump’s coercive diplomacy style – maximum pressure to force the adversary to capitulate or negotiate on American terms.

Yet Trump also prides himself as a dealmaker and campaigned as a peace-president in 2024. Indeed, at his inauguration for this term, he declared he wanted to “stop all wars” and be remembered as a “peacemaker”. In the weeks before Israel’s strike, he publicly cautioned Netanyahu’s government against attacking Iran, insisting he preferred a diplomatic resolution. Even after the war erupted, Trump hesitated to immediately join in. For several days, the U.S. limited its role to surging defensive assets to the Middle East (e.g. moving ships and anti-missile systems to protect U.S. bases and allies) but not directly engaging. Trump told reporters, “I prefer peace, [I] prefer a solution at the table”, and initially framed Israel’s offensive as something undertaken unilaterally by Israel. This suggests Trump was keen to signal that the U.S. hadn’t started this fight, possibly to manage domestic expectations.

By mid-June, however, Trump’s tone darkened as Israeli cities came under fire. He conceded on ABC News, “It’s possible we could get involved,” citing the risk to U.S. forces stationed in the region. He then gave Iran an ultimatum: come to terms (through indirect talks with Israel) within two weeks or face U.S. intervention. Notably, this two-week deadline and demand that Iran effectively “sue for peace” mirrored advice from hawkish voices in his ear. It shows Trump trying to have it both ways – holding off a bit longer in hopes that the threat alone forces Iran to back down, but moving pieces into place for war if it doesn’t. As of June 21, that clock is ticking.

The Trump Team: Hawks, Restrainers, and Sidelined Voices: The Trump administration’s second-term national security team is an eclectic mix of “America First” skeptics of war and traditional hardliners – and their influence on Trump has varied. Unlike in 2017-2018 when figures like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo pushed aggressive stances, Trump 2.0 deliberately included prominent non-interventionists. The most notable is Tulsi Gabbard, the former Congresswoman and Army veteran who rose to prominence criticizing “regime change wars.” Trump appointed Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence, perhaps to signal a break from hawkish orthodoxy and bring in a critical perspective. Gabbard indeed delivered: in March 2025, she testified openly to Congress that the U.S. “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon”. This reflected the consensus view of U.S. intelligence agencies that, while Iran has enriched uranium, Tehran had not decided to actually pursue a bomb (a crucial distinction paralleling the 2007 and 2012 National Intelligence Estimates on Iran). Gabbard’s stance aligned with her belief that diplomacy and realistic threat assessments should guide policy, and that fear-mongering over WMDs can lead to catastrophic wars – as happened in Iraq.

However, as the Iran-Israel crisis escalated, Gabbard’s principled position and outspoken comments put her at odds with the more bellicose narrative some in the White House favored. Tensions between Trump and Gabbard spiked dramatically. Earlier in June, Gabbard posted a brief video on social media warning that “political elites and warmongers” were “carelessly fomenting… tensions between nuclear powers”, putting the world “on the brink of nuclear annihilation.”. This video, reportedly not cleared by the White House, infuriated Trump. He took it as a swipe at Israel’s war plans (which indeed it was – Gabbard was cautioning against exactly what happened). When a reporter later asked Trump about Gabbard’s statement that Iran wasn’t building a bomb, Trump snapped: “I don’t care what she said… I think they were very close to having a weapon.”. In private, according to NBC News, Trump even mused about dissolving the Office of the DNI altogether, saying Gabbard “does not add to his administration”. By mid-June, she was being sidelined – pointedly not invited to high-level Iran war deliberations at Camp David. This sidelining of the nation’s top intelligence official at a moment of international crisis underscores how distrustful Trump had become of dissenting views within his team. Gabbard’s factual intelligence assessment and anti-war stance were seen by hawks as unhelpful or even disloyal.

She was not alone. Pete Hegseth, Trump’s Secretary of Defense (and a Fox News alum who usually champions aggressive policies), found himself excluded as well. Insiders say “nobody is talking to Hegseth” on war planning. Why Hegseth? Possibly because he, too, had echoed Trump’s initial reluctance – he publicly said Trump “prefers a solution at the table” with Iran – and perhaps because the Pentagon bureaucracy was urging caution about stumbling into a major war. In any case, Trump’s top formal defense officials were being cut out.

Instead, Trump consolidated decision-making with a “Tier One” circle of advisers who had his ear and, crucially, his trust. This inner war council comprised Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State (and acting National Security Adviser) Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Dan Caine. These four were meeting with Trump frequently to weigh options while others were frozen out. It’s telling who is on this list and who isn’t:

• J.D. Vance was chosen as VP for his populist America First credentials. A 39-year-old Marine veteran and “new right” politician, Vance had long opposed another Middle East war. He warned during the 2024 campaign that U.S. and Israeli interests can diverge and that “our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran.”. In private chats among officials (leaked earlier in 2025), Vance blasted even limited U.S. strikes on Iranian proxies as “inconsistent” with Trump’s promises. True to form, as VP he has urged restraint – he objects to rushing into war on Israel’s behalf unless U.S. troops or vital interests are directly attacked. When criticism mounted that Trump wasn’t doing enough, Vance took to social media to defend the president’s “remarkable restraint in keeping our military’s focus on protecting our troops and citizens.”. Vance’s influence seems to have helped initially slow-walk U.S. entry into the conflict and keep the focus on defensive measures (e.g. protecting U.S. bases in Iraq/Kuwait from any Iranian retaliation) rather than joining Israel’s offensive. This is remarkable: a sitting Republican Vice President effectively echoing the anti-war base and warning against being dragged into another war. It has, unsurprisingly, angered more hawkish Republicans.
• Marco Rubio, by contrast, built his career as a traditional hawk. Now serving as both Secretary of State and acting National Security Adviser, Rubio has espoused a “tough on Iran” stance. However, observers note that Rubio has not broken ranks with Trump’s overall reluctance so far. Loyalty to the president seems to override his personal hawkish impulses – a dynamic one analyst called a cabinet of “chameleons” whose primary trait is fealty to Trump. Rubio presumably argues for maintaining pressure and backing Israel rhetorically, but as America’s top diplomat he also has to consider U.S. standing and the possibility of negotiating an end to the crisis. Still, Rubio’s instincts likely tilt toward intervention if Iran escalates further.
• John Ratcliffe, the CIA Director, is a Trump loyalist who previously served as Trump’s DNI in 2020. Ratcliffe is considered reliably aligned with Trump’s views. If Trump is inclined to believe Iran is on the cusp of a bomb (despite CIA analyses saying otherwise), Ratcliffe is not expected to openly contradict that in the way Gabbard did. In one telling episode from March, Ratcliffe publicly confirmed a pause in U.S. intelligence sharing with Ukraine – demonstrating his willingness to implement Trump’s unconventional decisions. In the current crisis, Ratcliffe has been part of the closed “Tier One” group, presumably ensuring that intelligence is presented in a way that supports Trump’s negotiating position (for instance, highlighting Iranian malign activities rather than dwelling on assessments that Iran hasn’t decided to weaponize its nuclear program). Ratcliffe also traveled to Israel in April to meet with Netanyahu, a sign of close intelligence coordination. As CIA chief, he would be key if the U.S. were to plan strikes – providing targeting intelligence and analysis of Iranian responses.
• Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, along with Gen. Michael Kurilla at Central Command, represent the military’s voice. Reports indicate a split within the Pentagon: Gen. Kurilla wanted to shift more U.S. forces to the Mideast to back Israel, while Elbridge Colby (a defense policy official known for advocating focus on China) opposed overcommitting to the region. The fact that Generals Caine and Kurilla have been leading war planning briefings – with Hegseth cut out – suggests the professional military is deeply engaged in contingency plans if Trump orders action. However, the U.S. military is also wary after two decades of war in the Middle East. Caine likely has conveyed to Trump the high costs and risks of attacking Iran, a nation far bigger and more capable than any recent U.S. adversary in the region. We do know that so far U.S. forces have been in a defensive posture, and no operational coordination involving SecDef Hegseth or his staff is happening – implying Trump is keeping actual operational discussions very insulated.

Conservative Base and Political Pressures: While officials hash it out in Washington, the Republican base – normally staunchly pro-Israel – is notably split on this issue, feeding into Trump’s calculus. A large segment of Trump’s MAGA supporters are aghast at the idea of another war. They see Trump’s promise to avoid new foreign entanglements as central to his mandate. As the crisis unfolded, influential right-wing voices spoke out against U.S. involvement, even against Israel’s actions:

• Tucker Carlson, a prominent conservative commentator aligned with Trump’s base, bluntly argued that the U.S. should “not support the war-hungry government of… Netanyahu”. In his newsletter, Carlson wrote that if Israel chooses war, “not with America’s backing” – “drop Israel. Let them fight their own wars.”. Carlson warned that a war with Iran could spawn a new generation of anti-American terrorism or kill thousands of Americans “in the name of a foreign agenda”, outcomes “not beneficial for the United States”. Such rhetoric is astonishing if one recalls that criticizing support for Israel was once taboo in GOP circles. It shows a realignment where “America First” means skepticism toward unconditional support of allies when U.S. lives are on the line.
• Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), a long-time libertarian-leaning voice, echoed this sentiment. He urged Trump to “not join in any war between other countries,” reminding that Americans “overwhelmingly oppose our endless wars” and voted for Trump to avoid them. Paul also lambasted “neoconservatives in Washington” who he says are once again beating the drums of war heedless of the cost.
• Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, a fiery pro-Trump congresswoman, tweeted simply, “I’m praying for peace. Peace… That’s my official position.”. Greene had earlier privately cautioned Trump not to be misled by Israeli claims about an imminent Iranian bomb, drawing parallels to the false WMD claims in Iraq. Her stance reveals that even some of the most hard-right, pro-Trump figures balk at a potentially disastrous war driven by another country’s interests or dubious intelligence.
• Charlie Kirk, a pro-Trump activist normally very pro-Israel, admitted “our MAGA base does not want a war at all… They do not want US involved.”. Kirk’s comment is backed by polling: a YouGov survey found only 16% of Americans favor U.S. involvement in an Israel-Iran war. Even though the American public overwhelmingly opposes a nuclear-armed Iran (85% in one poll), there is a clear reluctance to fight another Middle East war to prevent it.

All this public pressure has created a strange bedfellows coalition urging restraint – progressive Democrats and populist right-wingers alike warn against repeating the mistakes of 2003. Democrats, for their part, have pointed to the intelligence consensus on Iran’s nuclear decision-making and urged the administration to prioritize diplomacy in concert with allies. President Trump thus faces a base that is divided and an opposition that is skeptical. His promise not to embroil the U.S. in foreign wars is being held up against him by his own supporters. This tension likely weighs on Trump’s mind as he contemplates using force. He does not want to alienate the “America First” voters or jeopardize his reelection prospects by launching what could become another unpopular quagmire.

On the other side, however, are hawkish influencers and donors pushing Trump to be more aggressive. The most vocal is Mark Levin, a conservative talk show host, who lambasted Vance, Gabbard, and others as “fifth column isolationists” within the administration. Levin tweeted, “LET TRUMP BE TRUMP!”, urging the president to ignore advisers seeking anything less than Iran’s total capitulation. He alleged that the restraint camp was effectively asking Israel to surrender by not finishing off Iran. Levin even accused Tulsi Gabbard of lying about Iran’s nuclear program and called the restraint advocates a “cabal of lunatics… many of whom are antisemites”, wildly asserting that the vast majority of Americans “want Iran’s nuke sites destroyed”. Levin and others like him frame the issue as a test of American resolve and a moral imperative to stop a genocidal regime. They argue any hesitation betrays both Israel and America’s own survival. Such voices carry weight in conservative media and with pro-Israel evangelical voters and donors.

Trump has met with figures like Levin (who had a private White House lunch with him in early June) and undoubtedly heard from donors who prioritize Israel’s security. In addition, Netanyahu himself is working every lever to secure American backup. Israeli officials have pointed out that only U.S. capabilities – particularly those Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker-busters and B-2 bombers – can finish the job at Fordow. Netanyahu has likely told Trump that the window to destroy Iran’s nuclear program is now or never, and that U.S. inaction would leave Israel alone and potentially vulnerable to an Iranian bomb down the road. The Israeli ambassador openly stated the operation “has to be completed with the elimination of Fordow.”. In effect, Israel is making its endgame U.S. intervention, since Israel lacks the means to take out Fordow independently. This puts Trump in a tough spot: ignore Israel’s pleas and risk Israel failing or even being overrun by escalation, or help Israel and risk owning a new war.

The strained Trump-Netanyahu dynamic also factors in. Iran’s Foreign Minister accused Netanyahu of “playing Trump… for fools,” saying one phone call from Trump to Netanyahu could stop the fighting. This comment highlights the perception that the U.S. is holding the leash and could yank it if it chose – raising questions about whether Trump is leading or being led. Trump, who dislikes the image of being manipulated, might chafe at the notion of being seen as Netanyahu’s pawn. But he also hates being seen as weak. If Netanyahu persists and Iran doesn’t fold, Trump may conclude that joining the fight is necessary to maintain credibility – both internationally (“America will enforce red lines”) and personally (“Trump is strong, unlike past presidents”).

In sum, Washington’s halls of power are divided between competing impulses: restraint (embodied by Gabbard, Vance, Carlson, Paul, etc.) and interventionism (embodied by Rubio, Levin, some Pentagon elements, and Netanyahu’s influence). Trump straddles these camps, oscillating in rhetoric. The outcome of this internal contest will shape U.S. actions in the coming days. As one expert noted, in Trump’s decision-making often “the last person to speak to him” wins. Whether that person is urging caution or aggression could decide if America enters this war.

IV. The Military Option: Weighing Intervention and the MOP Factor

What would it actually mean if the United States decides on military involvement? U.S. intervention could range from limited support (like providing Israel with munitions or intelligence) all the way to direct air strikes on Iran. Each scenario carries profound risks. Here we examine the military options on the table – particularly the role of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) “bunker buster” bomb – and the potential consequences of American action.

Bunker-Busters and War Plans

At the heart of the debate is Iran’s fortified nuclear site at Fordow, buried under tons of rock. Israel’s arsenal cannot reliably destroy Fordow, but the U.S. possesses the remedy: the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a 13,600-kg precision-guided bunker-buster designed to pulverize targets up to 60 meters underground. The MOP is so large that only the U.S. Air Force’s B-2 Spirit stealth bomber can deploy it. Each B-2 can carry two MOPs, and if used in succession these bombs can burrow progressively deeper into a hardened site. In other words, the Fordow question is essentially a U.S. question: will the U.S. directly use its unique capabilities to finish what Israel started?

Airmen inspect a GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bomb at Whiteman Air Force Base. The 30,000-pound MOP can only be delivered by America’s B-2 stealth bombers and is seen as the only weapon capable of destroying Iran’s deeply buried Fordow nuclear site.

American military planners have undoubtedly drawn up strike options that include B-2 bombing runs against Fordow, Natanz, and other key nuclear sites, as well as Iranian air defenses, missile bases, and command centers. Such an operation would be massive – likely hundreds of sorties on the first days, suppressing Iran’s ability to retaliate. Some in Washington believe demonstrating overwhelming force could cow Iran into rapid capitulation or even spur regime collapse. Advocates of intervention argue that if done decisively, U.S. strikes could eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat for good and perhaps fatally weaken the Tehran regime.

However, the Pentagon is acutely aware of the “wide-ranging ramifications” of using the MOP and U.S. bombers. An Associated Press analysis warned that if Washington deploys bunker-busters, it would mark a huge shift – from quietly aiding Israel to openly joining the war – and would likely kill any chance of Iran re-engaging in Trump’s desired nuclear talks. In essence, the moment a U.S. bomb drops on Iran, the prospect of a negotiated solution is gone. Tehran would see it as an official U.S. declaration of war, validating the hardliners’ narrative that America’s goal was always regime change.

Furthermore, while the MOP could destroy Fordow’s halls, there’s a terrible irony: bombing active nuclear facilities could itself cause what everyone fears – radiological contamination or “dirty bomb”-like effects. The IAEA’s Grossi has cautioned that strikes on enrichment plants risk releasing radioactive material. So far, Israel’s strikes luckily did not breach underground bunkers to the point of a radiation leak (radiation levels near Natanz remained normal, Grossi noted). But blasting Fordow – a hot site with highly enriched uranium – could scatter radioactive debris. Fordow is near the city of Qom (population 1.4 million). The human and environmental toll of such an attack, even if successful militarily, could be severe. U.S. officials must weigh that moral responsibility. The value of “moral leadership” would be tested if America causes a nuclear accident while ostensibly trying to prevent a nuclear weapon.

It’s also worth noting that American forces in the Middle East would immediately be in harm’s way once the U.S. intervenes. Iran might not yet have nuclear weapons, but it has a formidable arsenal of missiles (including long-range ballistic missiles), drones, and well-armed proxy militias. Over 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq, a similar number in Syria, and Navy fleets in the Persian Gulf would become prime targets for Iran’s retaliation if Washington openly attacks Iran. Iranian leaders have explicitly warned the U.S. that intervention would lead to “irreparable damage” – a thinly veiled threat to hit U.S. interests globally. The Pentagon has to plan for worst-case scenarios: missile barrages on U.S. bases in the Gulf, swarms of explosive boats attacking U.S. ships in the Strait of Hormuz, cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure, and even terrorist strikes via Iran’s operatives. A war that starts over nuclear facilities could quickly expand to a region-wide conflict involving Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and beyond.

Another consideration: would the U.S. pursue limited strikes or broad “decapitation” strikes? Israel’s campaign, while brutal, has been narrowly focused on military/nuclear targets and specific leaders. Some American hawks, however, have mused about using the opportunity to topple the Iranian regime altogether. They see Israel’s war as the beginning of a campaign to overthrow the Islamic Republic – a long-held neoconservative dream. They cite the success of killing Soleimani and now other IRGC leaders, and argue that accelerating Iran’s internal pressures (already high due to protests in recent years) could finally bring about regime change. But regime change is the ultimate long-term vision failure if attempted by force without planning: as Iraq demonstrated, toppling a dictatorship without an idea of the “day after” can produce a failed state or a new hostile regime. The U.S. has little appetite for occupation or nation-building, and Iranian nationalism – even among regime opponents – would likely surge if foreign powers invaded. So while some ideologues in Washington talk in those terms, more pragmatic voices, including in Trump’s camp, know that the U.S. is not ready to own responsibility for 90 million Iranians post-conflict.

Risks of Escalation and Blowback

If America gets directly involved, the conflict’s dynamics change overnight. It would become America’s war too, and Iran’s retaliation would expand correspondingly. The risks include:

• Regional Escalation: Iran could activate Hezbollah in Lebanon to rain rockets on Israel (dwarfing anything from Gaza or Yemen). It could encourage Shi’a militias in Iraq to attack the 2,000+ U.S. personnel there (those militias have sophisticated weapons and have harassed U.S. bases before). In Syria, remaining U.S. special forces could be targeted by Iran-aligned fighters. The Houthi rebels in Yemen might fire missiles at U.S. partner Saudi Arabia or even towards U.S. ships in the Red Sea – they have done so in the past. Israel might find itself fighting on multiple fronts (Lebanon, Syria, maybe Gaza again) on top of Iran directly. The U.S. would face the nightmare scenario of a multi-front war across the Middle East. Even actors like Russia – which has a naval base in Syria and ties to Iran – become factors; while direct Russian intervention against the U.S. is unlikely, Moscow could provide Tehran with more weapons or diplomatic cover, complicating U.S. operations.
• Direct Attacks on U.S. Forces and Interests: Iran has a track record of asymmetric responses. In any U.S.-Iran hot war, we could expect missile strikes on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar or Al Dhafra in UAE (major U.S. Air Force hubs), or on the U.S. Fifth Fleet HQ in Bahrain. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy might attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz by mining it or attacking tankers, as they threatened. This would not only spike oil prices but could suck the U.S. Navy into a prolonged campaign to secure shipping lanes (the so-called “Tanker Wars” of the 1980s redux). Cyber warfare is another domain – Iran could launch cyberattacks on U.S. banking systems or infrastructure in retaliation. The homeland terror threat would rise too; although Iran so far hasn’t directly conducted terror on U.S. soil, its proxies or sleeper cells could be activated in a full war context.
• Casualties and Humanitarian Crises: A U.S. bombing campaign, even with precision weapons, would inevitably cause Iranian civilian casualties – particularly if Iran, in anticipation, colocates military assets near civilian areas. Already, Israel’s strikes have killed hundreds of Iranian civilians, and images of hospitals bombed have spread anger in the region. If U.S. bombs add to that toll, anti-American sentiment – not just in Iran but across the Muslim world – will skyrocket. The conflict could create millions of refugees fleeing Iran if urban infrastructure is hit, as one analysis warned, overwhelming neighboring countries and causing a humanitarian disaster. The U.S. would then face international criticism not just for war-making but for the resulting human suffering, further damaging its global credibility and moral authority.
• Nuclear Proliferation Backfire: Paradoxically, attacking Iran to prevent a bomb might convince Iran’s leaders that only a nuclear deterrent can guarantee their survival. Indeed, Iran’s parliament is already debating a bill to exit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to the Israeli strikes. If the U.S. joins the war, Tehran could make the fateful choice to openly seek nuclear weapons as a last resort strategy, or at least leave all diplomatic constraints. A U.S. invasion or attempt at regime change would definitely push Iran to try to assemble any “crash” nuclear device it could as a deterrent. In other words, intervention might cause the very outcome it was meant to forestall, especially if war doesn’t completely destroy Iran’s extensive nuclear know-how. North Korea’s example looms large: they accelerated to a bomb after seeing Saddam and Gaddafi fall when they didn’t have one. Iran could follow suit if attacked, unless the war itself removed the regime from power.
• Loss of Focus on Other Threats: Strategically, plunging into war with Iran means diverting resources and attention from other U.S. priorities – notably the long-term competition with China and the simmering conflict in Ukraine (where the U.S. has been trying to broker peace under Trump’s new approach). Already, European allies are nervous; the G7 met and some, like France’s President Macron, strongly oppose military action, fearing a global crisis. The U.S. could strain alliances if it embarks on a war many allies see as avoidable. And if Iran closes Hormuz or destabilizes the Gulf, that could ironically strengthen China (which would get cheaper oil from a desperate Iran) and Russia (higher oil prices benefit Moscow). The strategic opportunity cost is huge – exactly what many “restrainers” warn about when they say a war with Iran would prevent the U.S. from focusing on issues that matter more to its future.

The Iraq 2003 Shadow: Credibility and Trust

Underpinning all these risks is a crisis of credibility. The United States still bears the scars of the 2003 Iraq War, launched on faulty intelligence and hubris. The intelligence failure – claims of WMD that didn’t exist – dealt a lasting blow to U.S. credibility. As the current Iran drama unfolds, comparisons to Iraq are on everyone’s mind. “Is this Iraq WMD all over again?” some ask. Indeed, before Israel’s strike, the key question was “is Iran truly on the verge of a nuclear weapon?” – eerily similar to the WMD question about Iraq.

So far, U.S. intelligence (and independent inspectors) say No – Iran is not there yet. Iran has enriched uranium to 60% (short technical steps from weapons-grade) and could theoretically produce bomb material in months, but crucially, Iran has not decided to build a bomb or taken steps to weaponize (such as creating a warhead or missile re-entry vehicle). As Stephen Wertheim noted, “Iran… was giving itself the option… producing highly enriched uranium, but had not yet decided to obtain a weapon, much less [taken] steps to construct one.”. This was the situation as negotiations were ongoing. That nuance is vital. It argues for diplomacy – because Iran’s program, while advanced, was still within a sphere of possible constraints and monitoring if a deal could be struck. It undercuts the claim that war is the only solution.

However, the war fever threatens to drown out nuanced intelligence just as it did in 2003. Already, we saw Trump dismissing his DNI’s assessment, and hawks claiming Gabbard and others were “lying” about Iran’s nuclear status. The push for war often involves inflating threats and discrediting contrary evidence. This time, though, many are not buying it. Isolationist and moderate voices alike cite Iraq as a cautionary tale: America must not be fooled again by worst-case scenarios presented as fait accompli.

And it’s not just the initial decision – it’s the aftermath credibility too. The Iraq war’s ultimate cost in lives (thousands of Americans, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis) and dollars (trillions) far outweighed any gains, and it failed to achieve a stable, pro-U.S. Iraq. It’s a huge part of why Americans today are so war-weary. If the U.S. now intervenes in Iran without a very clear justification and endgame, it risks repeating that cycle – with potentially even graver consequences given Iran’s size and capabilities. American leaders would have to answer: why should Americans sacrifice again? What is the clear objective, and what is Phase 4 (post-war) plan? So far those answers are lacking or unconvincing, which fuels the skepticism.

Former U.S. officials and generals have been quietly advising caution, reminding current policymakers of how easy it was to get into Iraq and how hard to get out. Even some staunch Israel supporters in Congress are urging that U.S. intelligence must guide decisions, not emotional reactions or ally pressures, lest we stumble into another intelligence fiasco that erodes trust in government. The Biden-era focus on restoring alliances and U.S. reliability could be undone if Washington is seen as rushing to war on dubious grounds (especially if it emerges that Israel’s strike was as much about halting diplomacy as about an imminent nuke threat).

In short, the credibility gap from Iraq looms over U.S. deliberations. To maintain moral leadership, U.S. actions must be based on truth and law, not manipulated intelligence or unexamined assumptions. The world remembers Colin Powell’s U.N. presentation in 2003 with regret. No one wants a repeat where U.S. officials claim certainty about a nuclear threat that later proves either false or something that negotiations could have contained.

V. Between Coercion and Diplomacy: Is There a Peace Path?

With bombs falling and deadlines issued, it’s hard to imagine diplomacy making a comeback. Yet, paradoxically, both Washington and Tehran have signaled interest in talks – just under radically different conditions. This reflects the broader tension between coercive diplomacy and genuine diplomacy at play. Is the U.S. using the prospect of talks as a cover while squeezing Iran militarily (“talks on our terms after we’ve weakened you”)? Or is there a real chance to negotiate an end to hostilities and a new nuclear agreement? The answer may determine whether this conflict expands or is defused.

In the weeks before the war, the U.S. and Iran were quietly negotiating in Oman. In fact, by some accounts they were nearing a breakthrough. Stephen Wertheim notes that for two months prior, Trump’s team and Iranian officials in Oman had been getting “closer to a deal that would drastically curtail Tehran’s enrichment… and prevent any path to the bomb.”. One idea under discussion was a regional uranium enrichment consortium that would remove weapons-grade possibilities and integrate Iran economically. Such creative diplomacy might have yielded a win-win: Iran’s economy gets relief and regional acceptance, while its nuclear program stays purely peaceful under multilateral oversight. Saudi Arabia’s recent rapprochement with Iran (restoring ties in 2023) had opened space for such an approach.

Crucially, “Then Israel attacked,” as Wertheim starkly puts it. He argues Israel acted “less to preempt an Iranian bomb than to preempt American diplomacy.”. Indeed, a new deal would lift sanctions and empower Iran regionally – an outcome Netanyahu abhorred. From Israel’s perspective, even a non-nuclear Iran is a threat if it is stronger economically and politically. A normalized Iran could compete with Israel for influence. So Israel gambled on war to forestall that diplomatic outcome. Netanyahu seems to have calculated that confronting Iran militarily would either force Iran’s capitulation or draw in the U.S. to finish the job – either preferable (to him) than an Iran reintegrated via a deal.

Iran’s reaction has been two-fold. Publicly, they responded with defiance and counterattacks. But diplomatically, they sent signals: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, speaking from Istanbul, said clearly: “In order for us to come back to diplomacy, the aggression should be stopped.”. He added Iran “cannot negotiate with the U.S. while our people are under bombardment with U.S. support”. This implies that if a ceasefire can be secured, Iran is willing to resume talks – but not under bombs. Araghchi also warned that if the U.S. joins the war actively, that would be “very, very dangerous for everyone.”, reinforcing that Iran would escalate massively if attacked by America. Notably, he referenced that Israel attacked “two days before the sixth round of nuclear negotiations” was to start. In other words, Iran sees the timing as deliberate sabotage of diplomacy, and wants the world to know it was ready to negotiate until bombs fell.

From the U.S. side, the White House line has been inconsistent. Trump claims Iranian officials have reached out begging to negotiate now. Indeed, he announced that “Iranian officials are eager to negotiate” but then immediately added “it’s very late to be talking”, suggesting skepticism about their motives or simply that events have overtaken talks. Trump has framed Israel’s military campaign as actually strengthening his hand in talks – arguing that Iran, under bombardment, will be forced to make concessions it wouldn’t otherwise. This is classic coercive diplomacy logic: use force or the threat of force to get a better deal at the table. It’s the same logic that underpinned Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign and, historically, many U.S. policies.

However, there is deep skepticism about U.S. intentions in these negotiations. Iran’s leadership suspects – not without reason – that the U.S. might not really want a compromise, but rather an Iranian surrender. Trump’s own rhetoric demanding “unconditional surrender” of Iran’s nuclear program (dismantling it entirely) reinforces Tehran’s cynicism. A White House proposal for direct talks was flatly rejected by Iran right after the Israeli strikes, with Iran saying it won’t negotiate “under duress”. Iranian officials likely feel that any deal now, with bombs falling, would be akin to signing terms of capitulation.

Furthermore, Trump’s domestic critics worry that the administration isn’t truly pursuing peace. When Trump says a deal is possible but concurrently issues a two-week war ultimatum, it undermines confidence that diplomacy is genuine. The credibility gap from past behavior (e.g. Trump tore up the last Iran deal; will Iran trust a new one with him?). Also, if key U.S. negotiators themselves are being undermined or killed (the Al Jazeera piece noted “several top negotiators [were] killed by Israeli strikes”), that derails the diplomatic track. Iran’s foreign minister’s comment – that Trump could end this with one phone call to Israel – implies that Iran sees the U.S. as having the power to halt Israel, but choosing not to, which to them signals bad faith by Washington in negotiations.

The scenario thus is: genuine diplomacy (where each side makes concessions for mutual benefit) was on the cusp of progress but got sabotaged by war. Now only coercive diplomacy (one side trying to strong-arm the other) is in play, unless a ceasefire occurs. Moral leadership would dictate trying to stop the killing and resume talking. Trump has a window – however narrow – to broker a halt. Some at the U.N. and EU are urging an immediate ceasefire and mediated talks, recalling how U.S. diplomacy helped end Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 or Gaza wars.

But can the U.S. appear “principled” rather than reactive here? Right now, Washington appears reactive – it’s responding to what Israel did and what Iran does, rather than charting its own principled course. A principled approach might involve the U.S. saying to its ally Israel: “Enough. You’ve secured some objectives, but our interest is now in preventing a wider war and humanitarian catastrophe.” America could leverage its aid and influence to compel Israel to stand down further strikes, while simultaneously offering Iran a face-saving path to de-escalate (perhaps a temporary lifting of some sanctions as a goodwill gesture to get talks going, or U.N.-supervised pauses in hostilities). This would require moral courage – essentially reining in an ally for the greater good, demonstrating that U.S. values are not purely transactional or subordinate to another nation’s agenda.

Critics argue that so far, America has not done this. Iran’s leaders certainly see the U.S. as green-lighting Israel’s actions, given the U.S. consistently vetoes any U.N. Security Council action against Israel and provides diplomatic cover. If the U.S. wants to change that perception, it could, for instance, publicly endorse the IAEA’s calls for restraint and maybe initiate an international contact group to negotiate a dual freeze (Israel stops strikes, Iran stops missiles, and both agree to a new round of nuclear talks). The question is whether the Trump administration is willing to apply pressure on Israel – something Trump has rarely done, but interestingly he did initially oppose Israel striking Iran until Netanyahu went ahead anyway.

In the current dynamic, Netanyahu might not listen unless the U.S. makes clear it will not enter the war and he risks isolation. Conversely, if Netanyahu believes the U.S. will ultimately join him, he has little incentive to cease fire. Thus, America’s stance itself is a lever. By appearing too ready to intervene, the U.S. might encourage Israeli maximalism. By clearly pulling back, the U.S. might force Israel to accept a shorter operation. This is the reactive vs principled distinction: reactive means waiting to see if Israel “needs” us and then jumping in; principled means asserting what outcome the U.S. seeks (e.g. no regional war, no nuclear Iran, yes to a diplomatic solution) and taking actions aligned with those principles even if it means saying no to an ally in the short term.

As of June 21, President Trump still has choices. He can still heed the restraint voices and pursue the outlines of the deal that was on the table in Oman, leveraging now the fact that Iran has been hit hard (perhaps more amenable to limits) but also recognizing Iran’s resolve (they won’t surrender outright). Such a negotiation would need to involve major powers – reassembling something like the P5+1 format (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China with Iran). Notably, Europe, Russia, and China all oppose an expanded war and would support a return to talks. A principled U.S. would use that international support to forge a credible strategic plan for the region: preventing a nuclear Iran through verified limits and preventing war through security arrangements.

Skeptics of Iran will say this is naive, that Iran only understands force. But history shows Iran does negotiate seriously when offered respect and relief (JCPOA as case in point). Even in this conflict, Iran’s condition for talks – stop bombing us – is a rational position. The U.S. could test Iran’s sincerity by pausing hostilities and seeing if Iran comes back to negotiations in good faith to finish what was being drafted. If Iran instead escalated or broke promises, the U.S. could always recalibrate. But not exploring that path would be a tragic missed opportunity.

VI.  Bound by Fire: Israel, America, and the Burdens of Alliance

Finally, we must candidly assess how Israel’s actions are shaping U.S. choices, and the risk that America’s policy is being driven by a partner’s agenda rather than its own clear principles. The U.S.-Israel alliance is based on deep-seated strategic and moral ties – shared democratic values, a commitment to Israel’s security after the horrors of the Holocaust, and mutual enemies in the region. Yet this crisis lays bare a tension: Israel’s immediate objectives and America’s broader interests may not perfectly align. The U.S. risks appearing reactive – even subservient – to Israel’s decisions, rather than acting as a principled superpower leader.

Israel’s government, led by Netanyahu, decided to launch a war that the U.S. was not actively seeking at this time. Trump’s own advisers say he opposed an Israeli strike initially, preferring to pursue the negotiations. Netanyahu effectively forced Washington’s hand. The optics of this are problematic for America. Around the world – and among many Americans – there is a perception that Washington is being dragged into conflict because Israel started one. If the U.S. jumps in militarily now, it could reinforce narratives that U.S. foreign policy is “controlled” by allies or special interests. This undermines the principle of sovereign decision-making based on national interest.

From a moral standpoint, aligning unconditionally with Israel also means owning Israel’s conduct in this war. And Israel’s conduct, frankly, has been ruthless. Strikes on civilian sites like media offices and hospitals, even if unintentional, have killed scores of innocents. The human toll in Iran is eliciting sympathy internationally. If America is seen as giving carte blanche (through weapons, intel, or eventual direct support) to such strikes, it tarnishes America’s moral image. U.S. leaders often speak of a “rules-based order” and protection of civilians; being complicit in actions that violate those norms (like bombing medical facilities, which is against international law) would weaken U.S. claims to moral leadership.

There’s also the risk that the U.S. appears reactive tactically. As one Middle East analyst put it, it’s like the tail wagging the dog – Netanyahu acts and Washington scrambles after the fact. Ideally, allies coordinate such that something this consequential would be a joint decision or at least properly consulted. If Netanyahu blindsided Trump (reports are mixed, but it seems Israel gave the U.S. only short notice before the strike), that indicates a troubling dynamic. Some insiders speculate that Netanyahu deliberately presented Trump with a fait accompli: war is happening, either help us or we go it alone. This puts any U.S. president in a tough position – abandon an ally in combat (politically costly domestically) or jump in without having decided the timing or necessity of the fight.

Netanyahu’s personal relationship with Trump is complex. They were close during Trump’s first term, but Netanyahu quickly acknowledged Biden’s 2020 victory, irritating Trump. In this new term, some detect less warmth. Netanyahu might have felt he couldn’t rely on a hesitant Trump to green-light strikes, so he just did it. Now, however, Netanyahu is very actively lobbying U.S. officials for support. CIA Director Ratcliffe’s visit to Israel in April (amid Gaza fighting) was perhaps partly to discuss Iran strike scenarios. Israeli officials are emphasizing the danger of leaving Fordow intact, implicitly urging the U.S. to use its might. If America follows Israel’s lead now, it could set a precedent: that a regional ally can initiate a war and expect America to finish it.

America, as the superpower, has to think about the long-term vision. Israel’s government may be looking at short-term – eliminate the current Iranian threat, even if it means high risk. The U.S. has to worry about the next decade: the stability of the entire Gulf, nuclear proliferation, great power competition, etc. If Washington just reacts to an ally’s immediate concerns without integrating them into a broader strategy, it abdicates its leadership role. This is not to say the U.S. should ignore allies – but it should guide and sometimes restrain them for mutual benefit. A historical parallel: in 1991, President George H.W. Bush pressured Israel to not retaliate against Iraqi Scud missile attacks, fearing it would splinter the Gulf War coalition. That was U.S. leadership ensuring the wider strategy held, even though it was hard for Israel to stay its hand.

Right now, America could assert leadership by clarifying its principles: e.g., “We will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons – and we will not allow reckless actions that endanger regional peace.” This means supporting Israel’s right to self-defense but also insisting on proportionality and a clear political endgame. If Israel’s actions (like potentially bombing Fordow at the cost of radioactive fallout over civilian areas) cross lines that do more harm than good to global security, the U.S. should say so. That would show the world the U.S. is not merely reacting but standing on principle – protecting both an ally and the world from catastrophe.

Some observers worry that if the U.S. appears too deferential to Israel here, it could embolden other allies to act unilaterally in ways that drag America in. For instance, could Taiwan or Ukraine (hypothetically) take provocative actions assuming U.S. backup? Or will adversaries like China and Russia exploit the perception of U.S. distraction or suggest the U.S. has double standards (condemning their aggression but blessing Israel’s)? These are second-order effects on U.S. standing that policymakers must consider.

In Israel itself, there are even voices of caution. Israeli media reported that former Mossad officers urged an end to the Gaza war and now likely worry about the Iran front too. Israel’s public is war-weary after a prolonged Gaza campaign (the article hints the Gaza war has been ongoing for 20 months). So a U.S.-brokered de-escalation could actually save Israeli lives and avoid a worst-case for Israel (fighting Iran mostly alone if the U.S. stays reluctant). Sometimes being a friend means telling hard truths; the U.S. can be a true friend to Israel by helping secure what Israel needs (long-term security, which ultimately might come from a regional modus vivendi) rather than what some in Israel want right now (total victory over Iran).

In summary, the Israel factor in this war is double-edged: Israel is America’s ally and has legitimate security fears, but Israel’s aggressive strategy is imposing huge risks on America. The U.S. must balance honoring its alliance with upholding its own strategic interests and values. A reactive America would simply follow Israel’s lead; a principled America would cooperate with Israel where interests align and diverge where they do not – all while openly communicating that stance. The latter approach might be the only way to avoid the United States becoming, in effect, a co-combatant in a potentially unwinnable war without end.

Conclusion: Charting a Principled Path Forward

As of June 21, 2025, the United States stands at a pivotal decision point in the Israel-Iran conflict. The choices made in the coming days will reverberate for years in terms of lives lost, geopolitical balance, and America’s role in the world. This crisis has starkly illuminated the competing impulses pulling U.S. policy – alliance commitments, the drive to prevent nuclear proliferation, war fatigue, and the desire for moral high ground – and the difficulties of reconciling them.

To uphold moral leadership, the U.S. must lead in seeking to minimize suffering and uphold international norms. That means carefully weighing the humanitarian impact of its actions. Rushing into war behind Israel might demonstrate resolve, but it could also sacrifice America’s moral credibility if the war brings mass casualties or is seen as unjustified. Moral leadership could instead be shown by vigorously pursuing a ceasefire and diplomatic solution – proving that the U.S. values peace and human life, even as it stands strong against genuine threats.

To ensure credible strategic planning, any U.S. action must be part of a broader vision, not a knee-jerk reaction. The failures of Iraq in 2003 stemmed in large part from lack of an endgame. The same mistake must be avoided here. If military force is deemed necessary, it should be with clear, achievable objectives (e.g. deter Iran from nuclear breakout, protect U.S. forces) and a plan for the day after – how to de-escalate and move to a sustainable equilibrium. If diplomacy is chosen, it must be robust and realistic, addressing the concerns of all parties (Iran’s security and economic relief, Israel’s security guarantee, regional security architecture). In either case, the U.S. needs to communicate its strategy clearly to the American people and the world, to rebuild trust in U.S. leadership.

Finally, applying a healthy skepticism toward conflict without long-term vision is crucial. The voices of caution – whether from Vice President Vance and DNI Gabbard internally, or from civil society and veterans who remember Iraq – are not advocating pacifism at any cost; they are asking the hard question “And then what?”. This skepticism is not weakness; it is wisdom earned through blood and hardship. It echoes the sentiment that not every problem has a military solution, and even those that do require more than military power to truly resolve.

America’s involvement in the Israel-Iran war should therefore not be driven by pride, fear, or pressure from any side, but by a sober assessment of U.S. interests and values. What are those interests? Preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, yes – but also avoiding a regional meltdown, protecting Americans, maintaining global economic stability, and preserving alliances without being controlled by them. What are those values? Supporting allies, certainly – but also championing peace, human rights, and truth (including truthful intelligence).

It is possible that by the time you read this, President Trump will have made his choice – perhaps ordering strikes on Iran’s Fordow site with U.S. bunker-busters, or perhaps dispatching envoys for an emergency peace summit. As an informed public, we must hold our leaders accountable whichever path they take. If war comes, we must demand clarity of mission and mitigation of harm to innocents. If diplomacy reignites, we must be realistic that it will require compromises and patience.

One thing is clear: the United States must lead with principle, or it will be led by events. The Israel-Iran conflict need not spiral into an American war. With deft statecraft, Washington can support Israel’s legitimate defense while calming the overall storm – urging Israel to halt strikes that go too far, while offering Iran a way out that satisfies the world’s need to ensure it never obtains the bomb. This is a tightrope walk, but great powers earn their stature by navigating such tightropes.

In 2025, after decades of war in the Middle East, the American public’s instincts are understandably against another conflict. They recognize, as President Trump’s own base did, that endless war often undercuts our prosperity and security. That public wisdom should be heeded. There is a chance here for the U.S. to prove that it learned the lessons of the past – that might does not make right, that alliances are a two-way street, and that true security comes from stable peace, not perpetual war.

The Israel-Iran crisis has tested America’s moral and strategic compass. By recommitting to moral leadership, demanding credible plans for any use of force, and remaining skeptical of war’s siren song, the United States can steer through this storm. The coming days will show whether America chooses to be a reactive participant in a widening war or a principled architect of peace. The world – and history – are watching.

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