Soft power – the ability to shape others’ preferences through culture, values, and policy legitimacy – has long been a core element of American leadership. Joseph Nye defines it as getting others to “want what it wants” via appeal rather than coercion. Credibility of foreign policy is essential: as Nye notes, in today’s world “credibility is the scarcest resource”. Yet a series of foreign policy missteps has eroded that credibility and dulled the U.S.’s soft power appeal. When the U.S. misled the world about Iraq’s WMD program, for example, it severely undermined American legitimacy. Chatham House observes that the Iraq invasion “had a negative impact on U.S. credibility … with ramifications that persist to this day,” and Pew polling found global opinions of the U.S. “declined significantly as a result of the invasion of Iraq,” especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. Such failures of honesty corrode trust in U.S. moral authority and weaken the world’s attraction to American leadership.

I. Broken Promises: Iraq, Syria, Ukraine—and the Limits of Restoration

Central to soft power is the perceived legitimacy of foreign policy. The 2003 Iraq War exposed a chasm between U.S. rhetoric and reality: claims of looming WMD threats proved false, and the Bush administration’s intelligence “was based on a narrow interpretation” that vastly overstated the danger. This breach of trust is a textbook example of how lying damages soft power. The United States lost moral high ground, and even its friends began to question U.S. competence. As Chatham House notes, allies and publics around the world “no longer seemed to enjoy the same foundation of trust” with the U.S. after Iraq.

Likewise, U.S. actions—or inaction—in the Syrian civil war under President Obama strained credibility. In 2012, Obama declared that Assad’s use of chemical weapons would cross a “red line” with “enormous consequences,” but when poison gas was later used, the promised response never came. The BBC observes that “stepping back from [the] red line on chemical weapons damaged U.S. credibility, shaking the confidence of allies.” American allies and adversaries alike took note: non-intervention after Syria’s atrocities suggested the U.S. might not honor its commitments, encouraging rivals and leaving civilians to suffer.

In Eastern Europe, doubts about U.S. resolve resurfaced as Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and later invaded Ukraine in 2022. Even though the Biden administration took a markedly firmer stance—rallying NATO allies, providing large-scale military aid, and attempting to reassert moral clarity—the early stages of the conflict revealed lingering skepticism. Some European capitals questioned whether U.S. support would endure if domestic priorities shifted. The shadow of past inconsistencies loomed large, and despite Biden’s effort to restore allied trust, the long arc of uncertainty continued to erode perceptions of America’s reliability.

In short, each time the United States failed to act decisively on a strong pledge—whether in Baghdad, Damascus, or Kyiv—it undercut the legitimacy of its foreign policy, weakened the moral dimension of its leadership, and diminished its appeal as a trustworthy partner. Attempts at course correction have struggled against the weight of accumulated doubt.

II. Trump’s Foreign Policy: Disruption, Division and the Erosion of Trust

Under President Trump, America’s image among allies and global publics suffered a sharp reversal. Trump’s “America First” agenda included withdrawing from international agreements (Paris climate accord, Iran nuclear deal), questioning longtime alliances, and imposing tariffs on friendly countries. These moves, coupled with a polarizing style, fed the perception that U.S. policy was unpredictable and self-centered. Polls show the impact vividly: a 2019 Pew survey found that “a median of 64% say they do not have confidence in [President Trump] to do the right thing in world affairs,” and confidence in Trump was especially low in Europe (around 75% of Germans, Swedes, French, etc., lacked confidence). In most nations, views of Trump were far lower than for President Obama.

This collapse of trust under Trump bled into attitudes about America itself. By 2018 Pew found U.S. favorability was at or near historic lows in many countries. Critics worldwide pointed to perceived U.S. self-interest: the Pew report notes a “widespread perception that the U.S. does not consider the interests of other countries when making foreign policy decisions,” and that far more people said relations had worsened than improved. Compared to the Obama years, approval of the U.S. fell dramatically in close allies: Germany’s favorable rating dropped 27 points, France’s by 25, the UK’s by 11. (In contrast, some non-Western countries like Israel or the Philippines remained relatively positive, often due to their leaders’ affinity with Trump.) Even in Asia, where historically Americans have enjoyed higher trust, Trump’s tenure brought slight declines: Japan and South Korea retained positive views (around 60–80% favorable) but chipped down as well. In sum, friend and foe alike registered the change: “along with support for Trump’s policies,” Pew reports, “favorable ratings for the United States also declined” during his first term.

Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025 has deepened the patterns established during his first term—accelerating the erosion of American soft power through erratic diplomacy, institutional disengagement, and overt disdain for global norms. While hard power postures have remained assertive, the attractive dimension of U.S. leadership—its ability to inspire trust, admiration, and voluntary alignment—has continued to shrink.

Within months of taking office, Trump began dismantling key elements of America’s international moral and cultural outreach. Funding for educational exchanges, English-language programs, and independent journalism abroad was drastically cut. The U.S. withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council for the second time, while Washington’s engagement with multilateral forums—on climate, development, and digital regulation—became increasingly symbolic or confrontational. This has weakened the perception that the U.S. is an advocate for universal values, and instead reinforced the image of a power pursuing narrow, transactional interests.

More consequentially, Trump’s second-term foreign policy has sent mixed or contradictory signals to key allies:

• In Europe, the administration’s repeated critiques of NATO burden-sharing—combined with open praise for Hungarian and Serbian leaders—have further fractured transatlantic cohesion. France and Germany have resumed their calls for greater “strategic autonomy,” no longer treating Washington as the natural guarantor of European security.
• In Asia, U.S. commitments to Japan and South Korea remain intact on paper, but the abandonment of long-term diplomatic engagement with ASEAN and the administration’s sporadic messaging on Taiwan have raised concerns. When Trump threatened to withhold military cooperation from Seoul over trade disputes in April 2025, South Korean officials expressed “deep concern about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees.”
• Simultaneously, in Latin America and Africa, development aid cuts and public rebukes of democratic transitions (such as the tepid response to post-election repression in Senegal and Guatemala) have diminished U.S. standing as a normative model, opening more space for Chinese and Russian influence.

Global public opinion has followed suit. A May 2025 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that only 34 percent of respondents in 28 countries viewed the U.S. as “a force for good in the world,” down from 52 percent in early 2021. In Canada, trust in the U.S. as a reliable partner dropped to its lowest level in recorded history. In South Korea, favorable views of the U.S. fell by 11 points compared to the Biden administration’s final year, largely due to confusion over military exercises and the White House’s perceived indifference to Korean domestic opinion.

Perhaps most damaging to soft power, however, has been the devaluation of moral language in foreign policy. Under Trump’s renewed leadership, terms like freedom, human rights, and liberal democracy have largely vanished from the State Department’s lexicon—replaced by metrics of economic loyalty, border control, and national branding. This cultural reorientation has not gone unnoticed: editorial boards across Europe have noted that the U.S. no longer even attempts to speak as a moral compass, and instead “projects strength without solidarity.”

Taken together, these dynamics point not merely to a decline in America’s influence, but to a fundamental reversal of the soft power formula: where once the U.S. attracted by example, it now asserts by imposition. Where it once sought admiration, it now tolerates only alignment.

III. Allies and Global Publics: Perceptions of U.S. Leadership

The perception of American values and leadership is as important to soft power as any policy. Surveys reveal that beyond the presidency, many around the world currently have mixed feelings about U.S. society itself. In advanced democracies, Americans are admired for their technology, education, and culture (the U.S. gets very high marks for its movies, music, universities and tech innovations). But equally, people express concern about America’s divisive politics. Pew notes that “America’s vast cultural reach” is contrasted with “its divisive politics” in forming global attitudes. Only 17% worldwide say U.S. democracy today is a good model for others (57% say it used to be, but has fallen short recently). In some Asian allies there is surprise and discomfort over U.S. culture wars and social debates. Foreign audiences may not grasp all nuances of terms like “woke,” but they do see a country bitterly split along lines of race, gender and identity. Indeed, observers have remarked that America’s recent “culture war… greatly complicated and arguably destroyed our faith in government-supported efforts to win hearts and minds” abroad. In practical terms, a chaotic domestic image – from partisan infighting to high-profile protests – can make U.S. commitments seem less coherent. For example, allies have noticed conflicting messages on human rights: while the U.S. champions equality and justice, its own domestic struggles with racism and polarization have become front-page news globally. This combination of factors has made America’s attractiveness less automatic: people admire its culture and innovation, but wariness of its internal divisions tempers enthusiasm for U.S. leadership.

IV. Competing Models: European and Chinese Soft Power

Meanwhile, other powers advance contrasting soft-power appeals. The European Union projects itself as a “power of values”: it emphasizes international law, human rights, liberal democracy and environmental standards. In the EU’s own rhetoric (for example in the 2022 French election), leaders framed Europe as building a new civic identity based on these principles. Indeed, “the EU tends to employ more soft power policies,” one analysis notes, “attracting new members and allies through European values and the creation of a shared European identity”. However, Europe’s internal struggles complicate this. As think-tank commentator Mark Leonard argues, the continent is divided by competing cultural visions that “are uniquely unappealing to billions of people around the world.” The very debates within Europe over nationalism, immigration, and social values (exemplified by contests like Macron versus Le Pen) have undermined a unified narrative.

China offers a different model of influence—one built on economic connectivity, cultural assertion, and strategic messaging. Over the past two decades, Beijing has poured immense resources into portraying itself as a peaceful, rising power. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, it funds infrastructure—rail lines, ports, highways—to physically and symbolically weave together Asia, Africa, and Europe. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, China has contributed tens of billions to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other financing arms to promote regional development.

Culturally, Beijing operates hundreds of Confucius Institutes worldwide, promoting Mandarin language and traditional arts, and invites thousands of international students to Chinese universities on scholarship. It exports state-run media like Xinhua, CGTN, and China Daily, and it promotes narratives such as the “Chinese Dream” and the “China Model”—offering an image of disciplined governance, rapid modernization, and national pride.

Yet for all its investment, China’s soft power faces hard constraints. First and foremost is the authoritarian nature of the regime. While the Chinese Communist Party seeks admiration, it remains unwilling to tolerate independent cultural exchange or ideological reciprocity. Censorship, surveillance, and tight control over civil society limit the authenticity of China’s cultural outreach. Even Chinese students studying abroad are often monitored, and foreign students in China rarely experience true intellectual freedom. This undermines trust—and without trust, attraction falters.

Second, the linguistic and cultural distance between China and much of the world creates a high entry barrier. Mandarin is complex and seldom taught widely outside East Asia. Chinese media, rooted in state narratives, rarely resonates with global audiences accustomed to pluralistic debate. Unlike American music, film, or literature, Chinese cultural products have not achieved broad popular penetration across language lines or class divides.

Third, China’s economic outreach is often accompanied by strings. From Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port to political influence in African or Latin American media, observers note patterns of debt dependency and elite capture. The lack of transparency in many Belt and Road contracts, along with reports of labor abuses and environmental degradation, has sparked backlash in several recipient countries.

In recent years, polls have reflected these limits. While many governments appreciate China’s economic engagement, public sentiment often remains ambivalent. A 2023 Pew survey found that majorities in Europe, North America, India, Japan, and Australia held unfavorable views of China, citing concerns about human rights, political repression, and military assertiveness. Even in parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, initial enthusiasm for Chinese investment has been tempered by worries over sovereignty and fairness.

In short, while China presents a confident narrative of order and development, its soft power remains bounded by the coercive nature of its governance, the opacity of its intentions, and the narrowness of its cultural appeal. Its model may impress—but it rarely inspires. And in the realm of soft power, inspiration is what matters most.

V. Renewing American Soft Power: Culture, Credibility, and a Shared Horizon

As an outsider—European by birth, historian by training—I still believe that the world needs an America that inspires rather than imposes. The U.S. cannot regain its soft power through branding alone. It must mean what it says. And it must begin again to say something worth believing in.

America’s greatest strength has never been its military or its wealth, but its aspiration: to be a republic where liberty and dignity belong to all, not just to some. That aspiration has traveled across borders not only through Hollywood and Harvard, but through the patient, principled work of diplomacy—when America sent teachers, built libraries, supported local journalists, and stood up for dissidents with the quiet authority of a nation that had wrestled with its own imperfections.

That legacy is now at risk. The world sees the anger on American campuses, the division in its elections, the inconsistency in its alliances. It sees not only Trump, but a system that seems uncertain of its own compass. And yet—despite all this—millions still look to the United States with cautious hope. That hope is soft power. But it cannot survive long on nostalgia or inertia.

If the United States wishes to be admired again, it must first be understood—not only as a power, but as a partner. That means investing seriously in the infrastructure of connection: in public schools abroad that teach English not just as a language, but as a gateway to cultural exchange; in online platforms that offer accessible American literature, history, and civic thought to young people in dozens of languages; in exchange programs that are not just elite scholarships, but community-building experiences. And it means listening, not only speaking—recognizing the dignity of those who question, resist, or even resent America’s past role in their countries.

More than ever, the U.S. must match its message to its conduct. That means a foreign policy where multilateral cooperation is not tactical but principled. Where climate action, health solidarity, and education are not afterthoughts but foundational. Where defending democracy includes the humility to face one’s own democratic fractures—and to fix them in public view.

And yes, this also means confronting the cultural confusion within. An America at war with itself—oscillating between overzealous ideological crusades and cynical dismissals of its own diversity—cannot hope to be heard clearly abroad. Cultural renewal requires balance: neither erasing history nor weaponizing it; neither exporting moral panic nor suppressing moral progress. A revitalized soft power would embrace pluralism without performance, and reform without disdain.

In the end, soft power is not about seduction—it is about trust. It is earned in classrooms, town halls, and quiet alliances. It is restored when the United States speaks less about greatness and more about service. Not as a savior, but as a flawed democracy striving—still—to offer something generous to the world.

If that ambition can be reclaimed, then America’s soft power may not just return. It may evolve into something wiser, deeper, and more resilient than before.

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